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The “War on Terror” is Over – Now What? Restoring
the Four Freedoms as a Foundation for Peace and
Security
Mark R. Shulman*
As for our common defense, we reject as false the choice between
our safety and our ideals. Our founding fathers faced with perils
that we can scarcely imagine, drafted a charter to assure the rule
of law and the rights of man, a charter expanded by the blood of
generations. Those ideals still light the world, and we will not give
them up for expedience’s sake. And so, to all other peoples and
governments who are watching today, from the grandest capitals to
the small village where my father was born: know that America is a
friend of each nation and every man, woman and child who seeks a
future of peace and dignity, and we are ready to lead once more.
—Barack H. Obama
Inaugural Address, Jan. 20, 2009 1
The so-called “War on Terror” has ended. 2 By the end of his first week
in office, President Barack H. Obama had begun the process of dismantling
some of the most notorious “wartime” measures. 3 A few weeks before,
recently re-appointed Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates had clearly
forsaken the contentious label in a post-election essay on U.S. strategy in
* Assistant Dean for Graduate Programs and International Affairs and Adjunct
Professor of Law at Pace University School of Law. B.A., Yale University; M.St. (modern
history), Oxford University; Ph.D. (history), University of California, Berkeley; J.D.,
Columbia University School of Law. Harold Hongju Koh’s presentation at the 2006 annual
meeting of the American Association of Law Schools, Section on National Security Law,
provided the initial inspiration for this article. Three years later, this article won that
section’s writing competition and was presented at the annual meeting in January 2009. A
previous iteration of this article appeared in the Fordham Law Review. See Mark R.
Shulman, The Four Freedoms as Good Law and Grand Strategy in a Time of Insecurity, 77
FORDHAM L. REV. 555 (2008). The author is sincerely grateful for the diligent and
thoughtful contributions of that journal’s editors. He also benefited from comments by
Stephen I. Vladeck and Sasha Greenawalt. Any comments should be addressed to the author
at Shulman@aya.yale.edu.
1. President Barack Hussein Obama, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/inaugural-address/.
2. See Dana Priest, Bush’s ‘War’ on Terror Comes to a Sudden End WASH. POST,
Jan. 23, 2009; Accord, more recently and somewhat more definitively, Jay Solomon, U.S.
Drops ‘War on Terror’ Phrase, Clinton Says WALL. ST. J., Mar. 31, 2009.
3. See Exec. Order – Review And Disposition of Individuals Detained at The
Guantánamo Bay Naval Base and Closure of Detention Facilities, Executive Office Of The
President, (2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/ClosureOf
GuantanamoDetentionFacilities/; Exec. Order – Review of Detention Policy Options,
Executive Office of The President, (2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.
gov/the_press_ office/ReviewofDetentionPolicyOptions/; and Exec. Order – Ensuring
Lawful Interrogations, Executive Office of The President, (2009), available at http://www.
whitehouse. gov/the_press_office/EnsuringLawfulInterrogations/.
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Foreign Affairs. 4 Gates noted this historic shift in an almost off-handed
way: “What is dubbed the war on terror is, in grim reality, a prolonged,
worldwide irregular campaign – a struggle between the forces of violent
extremism and those of moderation.” 5 At the same time, the Obama
administration is taking care to reconfirm its commitment to defending the
United States and its interests against the threat of radical Islamists, among
others. However, because it is hard to replace something with nothing, 6 the
President should go further and offer a positive formulation – based on
good law as well as sound policy – of how he will lead us to a “future of
peace and dignity.” He should restore Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Four
Freedoms to a central place in the nation’s grand strategy.
***
In the future days, which we seek to make secure, we look forward
to a world founded upon four essential human freedoms.
The first is freedom of speech and expression--everywhere in the
world.
The second is freedom of every person to worship God in his own
way – everywhere in the world.
The third is freedom from want--which, translated into universal
terms, means economic understandings which will secure to every
nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants – everywhere in
the world.
The fourth is freedom from fear – which, translated into world
terms, means a world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point
and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position
to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbor –
anywhere in the world.
4. Robert M. Gates, “A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New
Age” 88 FOR. AFF. 28, 29 (Jan./Feb. 2009). Other observers have been pointing to the
inaptness of the term “war on terror” for years. For an early and notable example, see It Is
Meaningless and Dangerous to Declare War against Terrorism, THE INDEPENDENT (Sept.
17, 2001), available at http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/leading-articles/it-ismeaningless-and-dangerous-to-declare-war-against-terrorism-669538.html. See also Mark
R. Shulman, J’accuse for the Bush Administration, 3 NYU J. L. & SEC. 39, 40 (Fall 2004)
(book review) (favorably reviewing Richard A. Clarke’s Against All Enemies but faulting its
embrace of a “war on terror”); PHILIP H. GORDON, WINNING THE RIGHT WAR: THE PATH TO
SECURITY FOR AMERICA AND THE WORLD 4 (2007) (arguing that, formulated as a global war
on terror, the fight against terrorism has been fundamentally flawed from the start); RICHARD
N. HAASS, THE OPPORTUNITY: AMERICA’S MOMENT TO ALTER HISTORY’S COURSE 58 (2005)
(“So if terrorism is not a war, how should we understand it? Perhaps as a disease.”).
5. Gates, supra note 4, at 29.
6. IAN SHAPIRO, CONTAINMENT: REBUILDING A STRATEGY AGAINST GLOBAL TERROR
(2007) (political scientist proposing a strategy of containment because the U.S. faces real
threats that are not subsumable into a war and that “you can’t beat something with nothing”)
4 ff.
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That is no vision of a distant millennium. It is a definite basis for a
kind of world attainable in our own time and generation. That kind
of world is the very antithesis of the so-called new order of tyranny
which the dictators seek to create with the crash of a bomb.7
—Franklin D. Roosevelt
Annual Address to Congress, Jan. 6, 1941
When President Roosevelt articulated the Four Freedoms in January
1941, he was promulgating a vision for a postwar world system of states
dedicated to the promotion of respect for human dignity as a means to
ensure security. Roosevelt called for policies that would make the world
more secure by promoting freedom of speech and expression, freedom of
every person to worship God in his own way, freedom from want, and a
freedom from fear. This article examines FDR’s intentions and the
subsequent history of the Four Freedoms in order to reveal how the Four
Freedoms offer a principled and flexible paradigm for addressing the
challenges and opportunities of an era characterized by a rapidly changing
and formidable range of security challenges. It argues that the Four
Freedoms offer a more apt decision making framework than did the illdefined and alienating framework of a “War on Terror.” In place of an
unending and unbounded war, they offer a paradigm of enduring values that
would inform more humane policies and facilitate more rational decision
making. The Four Freedoms point the way to a grand strategy or national
policy that promotes long-term security, prosperity, and justice.
This article employs an interdisciplinary methodology, relying on the
tools of history, political science, and strategic studies, as well as a form of
constitutional interpretation that owes much to Justice Stephen Breyer’s
concept of “active liberty.” 8 This article explores the ways that the Four
Freedoms were framed to address the dire circumstances of the Second
World War. It analyzes the historical context of the 1940s in which the
Four Freedoms first emerged, how they formed the basis of the
International Bill of Human Rights, and how they evolved over the decades
that followed. The history explains how the values they embody were
quickly embraced around the world and then misplaced during the Cold
War. When the Four Freedoms framed the American mission, the nation
basked in unparalleled good will and wielded tremendous soft power. As
security policy strayed from the principles they embodied, the nation’s
ability to inspire and lead also diminished. Restored to their proper place,
the Four Freedoms promise a more effective grand strategy than a “War on
Terror” – one that relies more on demonstrating inspired leadership than on
7. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to Congress (Jan. 6, 1941), in 87 Cong.
Rec. 44, 46 (1941).
8. See STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION (2005).
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fighting and winning wars.
Part I introduces the argument that the Four Freedoms reflect
fundamental legal norms and that they offer a framework upon which to
develop a wise policy to promote meaningful and enduring peace and
security. Part II describes the historical origins of the Four Freedoms.
Roosevelt developed them as an articulation of American values and
objectives specifically in order to lead the nation to defeat an unprecedented
threat. He based them on his faith in American civil rights and his
experience facing down widespread want and fear. The Four Freedoms
were almost immediately incorporated into the Atlantic Charter as a
mission statement for the Allies. After the war, they were also incorporated
into the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other basic
components of international law. Part III examines the ways in which
definitions of the Four Freedoms – particularly the freedom from fear –
drifted during the Cold War era, plucked apart by those seeking to promote
one or another freedom, people who ignored FDR’s original formulation of
the Four Freedoms as a coherent strategy. This conceptual drift enabled
presidential administration of George W. Bush to prioritize the freedom
from fear at the expense of other important values. This distortion
promoted a dangerous grand strategy that emphasized fighting wars and
thus precipitated resentment and instability around the world rather than the
empathy, support and peaceful relations that would have bolstered
American security. Part IV further develops the proposition that the Four
Freedoms present a compelling paradigm for peace and security today.
Strategic adjustment is most effective when guided by a clear and
compelling statement of objectives. The prospect of restoring the Four
Freedoms to a central place in U.S. grand strategy offers such an
opportunity. The article concludes by returning to the Anglo-American
security partnership which forged the Four Freedoms in 1941 and calls for a
recommitment to the vision of a peaceful world articulated by FDR and
embraced by Winston Churchill, among others. When the Four Freedoms
are treated as a package, they offer not only inspiration, but also a wellbalanced framework for formulating effective policies to rationally address
such issues as the global economic crisis, climate change, and widespread
poverty, as well as the threats posed by radical jihad.
I. THE FOUR FREEDOMS AS BASIC LAW AND WISE POLICY
Taken together and read generously, the Four Freedoms articulate
sound policy for promoting long-term security and prosperity for the people
of the United States and around the world. They were forged in the United
States, tempered by the fire of World War II, and honed by the adoption of
the International Bill of Human Rights. 9 If restored to a central place in
9. For more on the International Bill of Human Rights, see Office of the High
Comm’r for Human Rights, Fact Sheet No. 2 (Rev. 1), The International Bill of Human
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U.S. grand strategy and implemented thoughtfully today, they should
advance security interests by reducing the threats posed by violent
extremists and presenting new opportunities for the spread of liberty and
prosperity.
President Roosevelt originally presented the Four Freedoms as a
bundle, enumerating them one by one. “The first is freedom of speech and
expression everywhere in the world. The second is freedom of every
person to worship God in his own way, everywhere in the world.” 10
Clearly, FDR borrowed these first two freedoms from the Constitution’s
First Amendment. For the third, he drew on his own New Deal programs
and signaled the need for international cooperation in order to achieve their
objectives globally. “The third is freedom from want, which, translated into
world terms, means economic understandings which will secure to every
nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants everywhere in the
world.” 11 Finally, and most famously, Roosevelt addressed what he viewed
as the particular circumstances necessitating his new policy and how to
avoid the tragic destructiveness of war in the future. “The fourth is freedom
from fear – which, translated into world terms, means a world-wide
reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that
no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression
against any neighbor – anywhere in the world.” 12
Over the next few years, the Four Freedoms were incorporated part and
parcel into the foundational documents of modern international law. As
such, they offer a broadly legitimate framework for policy formation and
decision making. As the historical section below will describe, FDR first
enunciated the Four Freedoms in January 1941. A few months later, they
were subsumed by the Atlantic Charter that cemented the Anglo-American
alliance. The 1945 Charter of the United Nations included them as basic
The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights
principles. 13
incorporated them as inherent to human dignity and thus inalienable. 14 The
Rights (1996), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs2.htm (“The International
Bill of Human Rights consists of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its two Optional Protocols.”).
10. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to Congress (Jan. 6, 1941), in 87 CONG.
REC. 44, 46 (1941).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 47.
13. U.N. Charter pmbl.
14. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810
(Dec. 10, 1948). For an exemplary discussion of the extent to which the Universal
Declaration represents a set of legal obligations, see Hurst Hannum, The Status of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and International Law 25 GA. J. INT’L
& COMP. L. 287 (1996) and see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 701,
n. 6 (1987) (“The binding character of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights continues
to be debated . . . but the Declaration has become the accepted general articulation of
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International Covenants on Civil and Political and on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights clearly embrace them. 15 Clearly, the Four Freedoms
express fundamental norms of international law. Because these norms are
so succinctly articulated, so universally admired and so thoroughly
internalized in legal cultures around the world, they constitute a valuable
tool for promoting peace and security. They offer the hope of an enduring
peace based on the rule of law – not one that rests on fighting long, multiple
or unilateral wars.
II. THE ORIGINS OF THE FOUR FREEDOMS AMIDST GLOBAL CRISIS
[T]he only thing we have to fear is fear itself – nameless, unreasoning,
unjustified terror which paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat into
advance. 16
By January 1941, the lawless, hyper-aggressive and highly successful
Axis war machine threatened freedom everywhere. The fall of French
Republic in the summer of 1940 clearly demonstrated to American
authorities that the expanding geopolitical crisis could no longer be ignored.
At that point, the Axis powers of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Imperial
Japan had conquered or otherwise come to dominate significant portions of
Europe and Asia, including Austria, Czechoslovakia, the Benelux countries,
Greece, Norway, Yugoslavia, Korea, much of China, and Southeast Asia.
America’s ultimate entry into the war seemed inevitable to many, including
most likely to President Roosevelt. That November, however, he was reelected for an unprecedented third term, campaigning on a promise that
“[y]our boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars.”17 In the fall of

recognized rights”).
15. See, e.g., infra note __ and accompanying text. The International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights recognizes that “the ideal of free human beings enjoying civil and
political freedom and freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are
created whereby everyone may enjoy his civil and political rights, as well as his economic,
social, and cultural rights.” 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966) (entered
into force Mar.23, 1976) (emphasis added). Likewise, the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights recognizes that “the ideal of free human beings
enjoying freedom from fear and want can only be achieve if conditions are created whereby
everyone may enjoy his economic, social, and cultural rights, as well as his civil and
political rights.” opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan
3, 1976).
16. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1933), in Text of
the Inaugural Address; President for Vigorous Action, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1933, at 1.
17. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Campaign Address at Boston, Massachusetts: We
Are Going Full Speed Ahead! (Oct. 30, 1940), in 10 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 517 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1950). Questions about Roosevelt’s
views on the inevitability of U.S. entry into the war have been the subject of inexhaustible
debates. See generally DIVINE, THE RELUCTANT BELLIGERENT, supra note __; and for a
summary of these debates, see CHRISTOPHER ANDREW, FOR THE PRESIDENT’S EYES ONLY:
SECRET INTELLIGENCE AND THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH, chapter
3 “Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Path to Pearl Harbor.”
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1940, FDR probably did not believe his own campaign rhetoric, but making
it appears to have been necessary for his re-election. In retrospect, the
dubious sincerity of FDR’s promise seems both obvious and excusable.
Facing isolationist sentiment at home and a fast-spreading war, he had no
easy choices. Speaking for the only major European power holding out
against the Axis, Prime Minister Winston Churchill and King George VI
had convinced FDR of the need to support Great Britain in its hour of need.
Churchill warned FDR that, without cash and supplies, Britain would also
succumb to the Axis juggernaut leaving the U.S. alone among the
remaining free powers. Roosevelt understood that the plucky Royal Air
Force and mighty Royal Navy presented the only meaningful bulwarks
against this catastrophe. 18 Yet most Americans continued to oppose any
policy that might lead their country into war. As one contemporary
historian bitterly observed of this isolationist impulse,
[t]he country was not ready to make or meet an enemy. Most
Americans were still spending their days slackly, insulated from
calls upon their energies, fortunes, or lives. Until they were
brought to the cold hard drill ground only a foolish diplomacy
would have hastened a crisis. But only a negligent diplomacy
would have failed to get ready for one, if the United States intended
to hold fast to the course it was on. 19
FDR demonstrated extraordinary leadership by paying respect to the widely
held isolationist views while doing everything possible to prevent an
irreversible disaster.
To avoid this calamity, FDR planned to offer to lend or lease war
materiel to the British, but first he needed the support of Congress and the
American people. A few months before and without authorization from
Congress, Roosevelt had traded fifty old flush-deck naval destroyers in
exchange for leases on British territorial possessions in the Western
Hemisphere. To launch his new plan, FDR chose the occasion of his
January 6, 1941 Annual Address to Congress. In order to meet growing
Congressional concerns about being shut out of the process and to minimize
the impression that he was taking the country to war through the back door
(a charge that President Woodrow Wilson faced often between 1914 and
1917), Roosevelt couched his new initiative in a soothing metaphor that he
presented to Congress. FDR likened the program to lending a garden hose
to a neighbor whose house was on fire. Suppressing the fire would end the
threat of its spread, and then the neighbor would simply return the hose. 20

18.
19.

Divine, The Reluctant Belligerent, supra note __ 92-96.
HERBERT FEIS, THE ROAD TO PEARL HARBOR: THE COMING OF WAR BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES AND JAPAN 124-25 (1950).
20. The literature on Lend-Lease is vast. For accessible and reliable overviews, see
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This “Lend-Lease,” FDR claimed, would reduce the likelihood that the
America’s home would engulfed in the flames of war. 21 And, at the same
time, he explained the nation’s common cause with Britain and her free
allies. In the same address to Congress, FDR articulated a vision detailing
the Four Freedoms and portraying a world in which the United States could
find common cause not only with states such as Great Britain but also with
individuals around the world regardless of nationality. 22 FDR framed the
Four Freedoms in a memorable appeal to principles and practicality: “In the
future days, which we seek to make secure, we look forward to a world
founded upon four essential human freedoms. . . . That is no vision of a
distant millennium. It is a definite basis for a kind of world attainable in our
own time and generation. That kind of world is the very antithesis of the socalled new order of tyranny which the dictators seek to create with the crash
of a bomb.”
According to FDR’s special counsel, the President dictated these now
famous words spontaneously a few days before, when reviewing the draft
text of his address to Congress. FDR may also have previously mentioned
some version of them offhandedly at a July 1940 press conference.
However, the words he dictated on New Year’s Day 1941 were by all
accounts both improvised and revised only slightly before delivering them
to Congress and the nation five days later. 23 The brilliant spontaneity of the
Four Freedoms may add to their allure as a statement of vision. But
Roosevelt clearly meant for them to be construed as establishing a coherent
and binding agenda. He started the dictation session by calling to his
secretary, “Dorothy, take a law.” 24 In an era before the government had

ROBERT A. DIVINE, THE RELUCTANT BELLIGERENT: AMERICAN ENTRY INTO WORLD WAR II
92 (1965) [hereinafter DIVINE, THE RELUCTANT BELLIGERENT]; ROBERT A. DIVINE,
ROOSEVELT AND WORLD WAR II, at 29 (1969) [hereinafter DIVINE, ROOSEVELT AND WORLD
WAR II]; PATRICK J. MANEY, THE ROOSEVELT PRESENCE: THE LIFE AND LEGACY OF FDR 126
(1998). As for FDR’s obfuscation, note Divine’s interpretation: “In 1939, Roosevelt
evidently decided that candor was still too risky, and thus he chose to pursue devious tactics
in aligning the United States indirectly on the side of England and France.” DIVINE,
ROOSEVELT AND WORLD WAR II, supra, at __.
21. An Act to Promote the Defense of the United States, ch. 11, Pub. L. No. 77-11, 55
Stat. 31 (1941) (commonly known as the “Lend-Lease Act”). While Roosevelt argued that
Lend-Lease might allow the United States to avoid entry into the war, he knew better. The
wizened Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, encouraged him to be more direct on this point.
HENRY L. STIMSON & MCGEORGE BUNDY, ON ACTIVE SERVICE IN PEACE AND WAR 368
(1948); see also JOSEPH E. PERSICO, ROOSEVELT’S SECRET WAR: FDR AND WORLD WAR II
ESPIONAGE 83 (2001).
22. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to Congress (Jan. 6, 1941), in 87 CONG.
REC. 44, 46 (1941).
23. See SAMUEL I. ROSENMAN, WORKING WITH ROOSEVELT 262-63 (1952); Hon.
Andrew S. Effron, Military Justice: The Continuing Importance of Historical Perspective,
ARMY LAW., June 2000, at 1, 1-2; see also MARCUS RASKIN & ROBERT SPERO, THE FOUR
FREEDOMS UNDER SIEGE: THE CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER FROM OUR NATIONAL SECURITY
STATE, at xvii-xviii (2006).
24. Rosenman, supra note __, at 263.
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established a formal interagency process for drafting and declaring a
national security strategy, FDR’s “law” was all that was required. 25
At first glance, the Four Freedoms may appear to present an unusual list
of claims, containing two sets of civil or political rights (expression and
religion), one bundle of indeterminate economic rights (want), and the
previously unarticulated freedom from fear, which appears to provide a
shorthand description of “peace on earth.” Viewed in this way, the list
includes two items derived directly from the U.S. Constitution, a third
aspiring to globalize the New Deal economic agenda, and a fourth intending
to restore Woodrow Wilson’s shattered vision for world peace.
The Four Freedoms might alternatively be viewed as two pairs of
freedoms. The civil and political rights of expression and religion flowed
from the values of the Enlightenment via the First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. The second pair may be viewed as products of FDR’s
experience in office, dealing mostly with the alleviation of discontent by
reducing people’s want and fear. An enthusiastic supporter of Roosevelt’s
vision, Louis Henkin acknowledged the novelty of FDR’s pairing. “In his
Four Freedoms message, Franklin Roosevelt articulated the new
conception, wrapped – perhaps disguised – in the language of freedom,
when he added freedom from want to the eighteenth-century liberties.” 26
The same can be said of the freedom from fear: wrapped as it was – and
perhaps disguised – in a notion of arms control. “The fourth is freedom
from fear – which, translated into world terms, means a world-wide
reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that
no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression
against any neighbor – anywhere in the world.” 27
Indeed, the Four Freedoms could be viewed as a list or as two pairs.
But to do them justice and use them most effectively, the Four Freedoms
should be construed as a package and as animated by the spirit of a rule of

25. For a comparison to the post-war national security decision making process see
Colin S. Gray, Strategy in the nuclear age: The United States, 1945-1991 in THE MAKING OF
STRATEGY: RULERS, STATES, AND WAR (Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, & Alvin
Bernstein, eds.) (surveying fourteen broad official strategy reviews from NSC 20/4 of Nov.
23, 1948 to the G.H.W. Bush Administration national security review of 1989 and finding
that they often repackaged old orthodoxy under the guise of new strategic thought); David
Alan Rosenberg, Nuclear War Planning in HOWARD et al., THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note
__ (describing the roles of Congress, the Presidents, and the military and the process of
defining and redefining nuclear strategy and finding awkward, unwieldy and dangerous
strategies).
26. LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 18 (1990). Also, see Mary Ann Glendon, The
Rule of Law in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 2 NW. U. J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 5,
43 (2004) (“One basic assumption . . . was that poverty and discrimination often set the stage
for atrocities and armed conflict. That is why Franklin Roosevelt included the “freedom
from want” among his Four Freedoms”).
27. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to Congress (Jan. 6, 1941), in 87 Cong.
Rec. 44, 46 (1941).
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law constructed upon respect for human dignity. As will be discussed at
greater length below, the Four Freedoms are most meaningful and useful
when read altogether. As a parcel of human rights and responsibilities, they
yield a comprehensive policy for meaningful and enduring security. Hence,
FDR’s introduction to the Four Freedoms: “In the future days, which we
seek to make secure, we look forward to a world founded upon four
essential human freedoms.” 28 The Four Freedoms must be read collectively
in order to ascertain the full meaning of FDR’s wise prescription for
security. Part III of this article explores more fully how to read and employ
them.
In another important innovation that merits high-lighting, FDR’s vision
of the Four Freedoms was explicitly universal in each of the elements and
in its overall ambition. He referred to the Freedoms as applicable anywhere
and everywhere in the world. In response to a question from a trusted
advisor about whether it was America’s obligation to ensure the Four
Freedoms for people of the East Indies, Roosevelt responded, “I’m afraid
they’ll have to be some day, Harry [Hopkins]. The world is getting so
small that even the people in Java are getting to be our neighbors
now. . . .” 29 FDR was articulating a globalized claim of human rights. And
people recognized it as such. William Allen White, the so-called Sage of
Emporia and unofficial spokesman for Middle America, exclaimed that
FDR had granted “a new Magna Carta of democracy.” 30 The audacity of
this vision alone would have caused a stir, both in an isolationist U.S.
Congress that had passed successive Neutrality Acts, 31 and around a world
ordered first and foremost by a robust interpretation of state sovereignty.
FDR’s January 1941 address to Congress – announcing the Four
Freedoms together with the Lend-Lease – received a wide range of
responses. Some Americans thought that Roosevelt had not gone far
enough to meet the Fascist threat. Some interventionists insisted that the
United States join the besieged Allies immediately. On the other side, some
claimed that the President was dragging the country into the wrong war
with the wrong enemy. Uninspired and attempting to thwart Lend-Lease,
leaders of the isolationist America First Committee continued to call for
some sort of accommodation with the Axis rather than embarking on a

28. Roosevelt, Message to Congress, supra note __, at 46.
29. ROSENMAN, supra note __, at 264. Established in the wake of World War I, the
League of Nations had pretenses to this brand of universalism, but in actuality the League
did not accomplish much to break up the colonial order that denied political rights to a
majority of people around the world.
30. TOWNSHEND HOOPES & DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, FDR AND THE CREATION OF THE U.N.
27 (1997) (citing William vanden Heuvel, The Four Freedoms, in STUART MURRAY & JOHN
MCCABE, NORMAN ROCKWELL’S FOUR FREEDOMS: IMAGES THAT INSPIRE A NATION 108
(1993)).
31. For more on isolationism and the Neutrality Acts, see DAVID M. KENNEDY,
FREEDOM FROM FEAR: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN DEPRESSION AND WAR, 1929-1945, at 394
(1999).
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mission to make the world safe for democracy. 32
Robert M. Hutchins, a progressive law professor and president of the
University of Chicago, raised one of the more interesting critiques of the
Four Freedoms speech, illuminating some of its appeal and its ambiguity. 33
A long-time supporter of FDR’s New Deal, Hutchins objected to LendLease on the grounds that it would bring the United States into the right war
but that it would do so prematurely. Hutchins embraced the vision but
questioned the timing: “With the President’s desire to see freedom of
speech, freedom of worship, freedom from want, and freedom from fear
flourish everywhere we must all agree. Millions of Americans have
supported the President because they felt that he wanted to achieve these
Four Freedoms for America.” 34 However, Hutchins advocated securing
those freedoms for Americans before taking on the Axis. “We have want
and fear today. We shall have want and fear ‘when the present needs of our
defense are past.’” 35 Assuming (incorrectly, as it turned out) that British
resistance would collapse, Hutchins advocated strengthening the American
moral position and husbanding its resources before entering the inevitable
war with Germany. Moreover, Hutchins predicted that the drive to win
such a war would throw the cause of U.S. freedoms back a generation or
even a hundred years. 36 Finally, Hutchins claimed that the “path to war is a
false path to freedom. A new moral order for America is the true path to
freedom.” 37 Pursuit of the Four Freedoms led the way to freedom; war did
not. At each point of his argument, however, Hutchins focused on the civil
freedoms (expression and religion) or on the want that pervaded American
society. And when referring to the Four Freedoms collectively, he appears
to have valued them as a means to “freedom” not to security. Doing so,
Hutchins was unable to grapple successful with the importance of the fourth
freedom. Apparently, even the most astute of observers did not know what
to make of the freedom from fear when it was first revealed. And as long
as the fourth freedom remained undefined, the Four Freedoms would too.
As Lend-Lease started to flow to the United Kingdom, FDR and
32. Elizabeth Borgwardt, When You State a Moral Principle, You Are Stuck with It:
The 1941 Atlantic Charter as a Human Rights Instrument, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 501, 521
(2006); DIVINE, THE RELUCTANT BELLIGERENT, supra note __, at 110.
33. A fascinating character, Robert M. Hutchins had previously served as Secretary of
Yale University while attending its law school. Upon graduation, he joined the faculty,
rising to the rank of professor and dean in 1928 at the age of 29. His tenure proved
contentious, so he moved to the University of Chicago to serve as its president the following
year. Hutchins was a dedicated “champion of academic freedom.” GEOFFREY R. STONE,
PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON
TERRORISM 314-18 (2004).
34. Robert M. Hutchins, America and the War, 10 J. NEGRO EDUC. 435, 436 (1941)
(based on a text delivered on January 23, 1941).
35. Id. at 438.
36. Id. at 440.
37. Id. at 441.
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Churchill strove to implement the tacit understanding that the President
would try to do even more to help extinguish the fire threatening the Prime
Minister’s house. In August 1941, the two principal leaders of the free
world convened secretly on warships in Placentia Bay off Newfoundland
for a meeting that subsequently came to be known as the Atlantic
Conference. 38 Their discussions focused on Anglo-American cooperation
in the military, diplomatic, and financial arenas. Talks were driven by the
shared recognition of the critical importance of meeting Britain’s materiel
needs. They were constrained by the still potent domestic political
opposition facing President Roosevelt.
Toward the end of this critical summit meeting, Roosevelt proposed
issuing a statement on their Anglo-American vision for war and peace
aims. 39 FDR sought to provide that moral clarity that would distinguish
their shared values from those of the Axis Powers. 40 Seizing on the
opportunity to cement the relationship, the British delegation quickly
responded with a five-point proposal drafted by Permanent Under Secretary
for Foreign Affairs Sir Alexander Cadogan. 41 Apparently, Cadogan had
brought on board his copy of the Four Freedoms speech, the principles of
which he reflected in the draft Charter. Three of Cadogan’s points proved
easily adopted: pledging nonaggression, promising self-determination, and
respecting forms of self-government that promoted the freedom of speech. 42
Cadogan’s other two points proved more contentious and were amended
considerably before FDR signed on to them. 43 One of Cadogan’s points
proposed to support a vaguely liberal economic policy – a kind of freedom
from want. The other proposed to ensure world peace through the
formation of a new organization dedicated to promoting and ensuring
international peace and security, i.e. promoting the freedom from fear. 44
FDR and Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles revised the economic
policy point to articulate a more explicit commitment to support, “with due
respect for existing obligations,” of the easing of restrictions on trade, and
access to raw materials on equal terms: “collaboration between all nations
in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor
standards, economic advancement, and social security.” 45 Consistent with
the intentions of the Four Freedoms generally, these economic and social
arrangements were all drafted to bolster the security objectives.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

DIVINE, THE RELUCTANT BELLIGERENT, supra note __, at 137-41.
Borgwardt, supra note __, at 519.
Borgwardt, supra note __, at 504.
Borgwardt, supra note __, at 519-20; see Hoopes & Brinkley, supra note __, at 36.
DIVINE, THE RELUCTANT BELLIGERENT, supra note __, at 134.
For detailed analysis of the drafting process, see Borgwardt, supra note __, at 519-

27.
44. DIVINE, THE RELUCTANT BELLIGERENT, supra note __, at 134.
45. The Atlantic Charter, Official Statement on Meeting between the President and
Prime Minister Churchill (Aug. 14, 1941), in 10 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, supra note __, at 314, 315.
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In light of the circumstances leading to the drafting of the Atlantic
Charter, its embrace of the Four Freedoms and emphasis on security is
unsurprising. In the Charter’s famous sixth point, FDR and Churchill
proclaimed, “they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all
Nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and
which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out
their lives in freedom from fear and want.” 46 Notably, this point paired
FDR’s freedom from fear with the freedom from want. The Charter’s
seventh point addressed freedom of the seas to prevent the kind of dispute
that had brought the United States into the First World War. The final point
picked up and expanded on the original articulation of the freedom from
fear:
Eighth, they believe that all of the Nations of the world, for realistic
as well as spiritual reasons, must come to the abandonment of the
use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea,
or air armaments continue to be employed by Nations which
threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they
believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent
system of general security, that the disarmament of such Nations is
essential.
They will likewise aid and encourage all other
practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples
the crushing burden of armaments. 47
With this point, the Atlantic Charter split FDR’s original notion of a
freedom from fear into two parts and then combined one of them with the
third freedom, the freedom from want. Doing so, it divided the freedom
from fear into an economic security strand and a peaceable
disarmament/coexistence strand. The Atlantic Charter also combined the
economic portion with the freedom from want as if to explain or justify the
aspiration for material well-being.
The Atlantic Charter of August 1941 presented a somewhat different
version of the Four Freedoms from that which FDR had presented to
Congress just seven months before. 48 The Charter both spliced the freedom
from fear together with the freedom from want and appended it to issues of
international conflict. Doing so muddied the clear message that the

46. Id. Emphasis added.
47. Id. Townshend Hoopes and Douglas Brinkley explain that the U.N. Charter limited
the agenda of disarmament to aggressors and potential aggressors in order to avoid
unnecessarily riling “extreme internationalists.” HOOPES & BRINKLEY, supra note __, at 3940.
48. The distinguished historian of war and peace, Paul M. Kennedy, attributes
differences between the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms to intentional vagueness on
the part of the drafters. PAUL KENNEDY, THE PARLIAMENT OF MAN: THE PAST, PRESENT AND
FUTURE OF THE UNITED NATIONS 25 (2006).
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freedom from fear had originally conveyed – that widespread possession of
weapons gives rise to fears. It redefined the freedom from fear, now with a
dual nature. On one hand, the Charter paired the freedom from fear with
the freedom from want, implying a belief that want and fear together were
the principal source of instability, and that they should be relieved as a way
to preempt conflict. This facet appears to reflect FDR’s New Deal
programs which arguably saved the republic with bold platform of
emergency relief payments, government-supported jobs, and the comforting
voice of a fireside chat. This agenda expressed the aspect of FDR’s
political theory that he had memorably explained with great effect in his
first inaugural address, “the only thing we have to fear is fear itself.” 49 On
the other hand, the Atlantic Charter’s formulation of the freedom from fear
paired it with two traditional mechanisms for improving security (restoring
a strong norm favoring freedom of navigation and establishing a new
organization dedicated to ensuring international security). America initially
entered the First World War to ensure freedom of the seas. During that
war, the objective morphed into a more ambitious program to create a
League of Nations that would not only ensure unfettered shipping but also
secure worldwide peace through a form of global governance. The Atlantic
Charter’s formulation, therefore, reflects FDR’s experience as Assistant
Secretary of the Navy Department in President Wilson’s cabinet during the
earlier war. This was the Roosevelt who had endorsed Wilson’s ill-fated
Fourteen Points, including the “[a]bsolute freedom of navigation upon the
seas . . . alike in peace and in war, [and]. . . [a]dequate guarantees . . . that
national armaments [would be] reduce[d] to the lowest point consistent with
domestic safety.” 50 In this age of insecurity, FDR’s analysis of its causes
was evolving. With his emphasis on freedom of the seas, he echoed
Wilson.
Like any good mission statement, the Atlantic Charter inspired many
and offended few. It seems that everyone found something to like in it.
Americans generally admired the Charter – albeit at an abstract level. 51
Anticolonialists around the world, such as the young Nelson Mandela
struggling to liberate his native South Africa from the colonial domination
of the Afrikaners, embraced its support for self-determination. 52 Those
who were least impressed with the Atlantic Charter labeled it an

49. Roosevelt, First Inaugural Address, supra note __.
50. President Woodrow Wilson, The Fourteen Points (Jan. 8, 1918), available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wilson14.htm; see also ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN
HISTORY 346 (Jeffrey B. Morris & Richard B. Morris eds., 7th ed. 1996).
51. Borgwardt, supra note 21, at 530 (citing two contemporary polls). But see JOHN
MORTON BLUM, V WAS FOR VICTORY: POLITICS AND CULTURE DURING WORLD WAR II, at 20
(1976) (citing polls that “revealed that motivations for buying bonds did not much derive
from enthusiasm for the New Deal or the Four Freedoms, or even from a sense of national
peril. Americans bought bonds for less lofty reasons, primarily to help a member of the
family in the armed services....”).
52. Borgwardt, supra note __, at 532.
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underwhelming example of hortatory prose because FDR had not also
pledged U.S. entry into the war. 53 But even they did not condemn it. 54
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor less than four months later
resolved the questions of if, how, and when the United States would join
the war. But in the meantime, the Atlantic Charter offered a progressive
vision that no one was bound to implement, so it was widely applauded.
Thus, it provided an important gloss on the Four Freedoms over the critical
years that followed.
After the United States entered the war, notions about the Four
Freedoms continued to develop as they entered the free world’s vernacular
discourse. The quintessentially American illustrator Norman Rockwell
produced a series of posters translating the Four Freedoms into compelling
graphic images. In the fall of 1943, they graced the covers of four issues of
the widely distributed Saturday Evening Post. 55 Over the next few years,
some 1.2 million people lined up to view Rockwell’s original posters as
they toured the country. Ticket sales for the tour raised $130 million
dollars in war bonds. 56
Insert Image of Rockwell’s Freedom from Fear
Despite this enthusiastic reception, the editors of the Saturday Evening
Post noted that the response to the freedoms they represented varied
greatly. One editorial explained,
For millions of people throughout the world the Four Freedoms
have come to represent something which gives meaning and
importance to the sacrifices which the human race is now making,
but these freedoms are by no means universally accepted as worthy
aims for nations at war. Indeed, a not inconsiderable number of
people regard the Four Freedoms as actually evil, an effort to
deceive people into imagining that they will never again have to
take thought for the morrow, since government will provide
everything for them. 57
The sympathetic editors of the Saturday Evening Post dismissed these
concerns. People should interpret the Four Freedoms more charitably.
FDR was not, they argued, obliging the United States to fight wars
53. See id. at 526-30.
54. Id.
55. See Richard D. Parker, Homeland: An Essay on Patriotism, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 407, 423 (2002). It is difficult to imagine Rockwell choosing instead to illustrate the
Atlantic Charter with its more “realist” language.
56. Effron, supra note __, at 2.
57. Editorial, The Four Freedoms Are an Ideal, SATURDAY EVENING POST, Sept. 25,
1943, at 112.
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anywhere on earth to support each individual’s freedoms of speech and
religion. Nor was he promising to create a global welfare state; the freedom
from want was an aspiration, not a panacea. Finally,
As to the Freedom from Fear, it seems to us to contain no meaning
more revolutionary than that suggested by Norman Rockwell’s
touching artistic interpretation, in the picture of parents regarding
the untroubled sleep of their children. Mr. Roosevelt expressed
Freedom from Fear as translatable into “a world-wide reduction of
armaments to such a point. . . that no nation will be in a position to
commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbor.”
Nothing about it guarantees against fear of measles, graying hair or
the consequences of laziness or incompetence. 58
Thus the influential Post editors explained the Four Freedoms as
“pretty well what men have always hoped for – political liberty, a better
standard of living and an end to war.” 59 While the editors did clarify the
meaning of the civil freedoms and reassured readers that the freedom from
want did not imply a welfare state, they left the freedom from fear with two
connotations, not entirely without tension. Did this freedom mean that
parents would no longer have to worry about their children or that
demilitarization would remove the scourge of warfare? Would it mean the
end of all meaningful threats or just the end of a fear of military invasions?
The war’s outcome no doubt would answer some of these critical questions.
It is difficult for the historian to accurately assess the universality of
acceptance of the Four Freedoms during the war. It does appear reasonable
to conclude that the Four Freedoms as a stand-alone mission statement were
subsumed by the Atlantic Charter and then by the January 1942 Declaration
by the “United Nations” (the Allies). 60 Even as the Charter and
Declaration reflected their principles, many people continued to cite the
original Four Freedoms to encapsulate the Allies’ common purpose. While
the content of the Four Freedoms was adopted into the legal texts, it
continued to be best expressed by the language of the original formulation
of the Four Freedoms. The Librarian of Congress and poet Archibald
MacLeish, acting in his capacity as part-time director of the government’s
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See Borgwardt, supra note __, at 533, for a historical discussion of these
documents and the human rights concepts during the war. See generally HOOPES &
BRINKLEY, supra note __. Interestingly, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson’s memoir
(written in the third person with McGeorge Bundy) confuses the chronology while
embracing articulation of the mission statement. Writing shortly after the war, Stimson
concluded: “Some critics of American policy have judged it astonishingly naïve in this
single-minded concentration on victory. Stimson could not agree. The general objectives of
American policy had been clearly and eloquently stated by Mr. Roosevelt first in the
Atlantic Charter and later (sic) in his assertion of the Four Freedoms.” STIMSON & BUNDY,
ON ACTIVE SERVICE IN PEACE AND WAR 565 (1947).
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Office of Facts and Figures, polled the American people to find out what
they thought about the Four Freedoms. MacLeish reported to the President
“[t]he Four Freedoms. . . have a powerful and genuine appeal to seven
persons in ten.” 61
Elsewhere in the ever-smaller free world, political leaders also seized
on the motivational value of the Four Freedoms. During the grim month of
July 1942 as the war came to Australia, Prime Minister Sir Robert Menzies
devoted several radio addresses to the theme:
President Roosevelt, in discussing the things at stake in this war,
made use of an expression – The Four Freedoms – which has now
found currency in most of our mouths. The four freedoms to which
he referred were: freedom of speech and expression, freedom of
worship, freedom from want, freedom from fear. One has only to
state them to get a response from the listener. Every one of us will
at once say, “Ah yes, I believe in those freedoms. The President is
right.” That the President is right I have no doubt myself; but that
we either fully understand or believe in these freedoms is open to
some question. I propose therefore, in this and my next few
broadcasts, to take each of these four freedoms and in turn,
endeavour to get at its meaning and significance, and work out
what it involves in our own living and thinking. 62
Menzies set out in the following weeks to define the Four Freedoms for
the Australian people, primarily by promoting sacrifices to win the war and
then a additional sacrifice of some sovereignty in order to ensure lasting
peace. 63 Likewise, New Zealand’s Prime Minister seized on the Four
Freedoms to applaud the Allies’ sacrifices and illuminate the Allies’
common ground. Addressing the Canadian Parliament in 1944, Peter
Fraser observed,
Your boys, boys of New Zealand, South Africa, India, the United
States and all the united nations have given their lives that the Four
Freedoms – freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from
fear and freedom from want – may be established and the masses of
61. BLUM, supra note __, at 29 (quoting Letter from Archibald MacLeish to President
Franklin D. Roosevelt (May 16, 1942)). For more on the Office of Facts and Figures, see
CLAYTON R. KOPPES & GREGORY D. BLACK, HOLLYWOOD GOES TO WAR: HOW POLITICS,
PROFITS AND PROPAGANDA SHAPED WORLD WAR II MOVIES (1990) 55-56 (noting that the
Office of Facts and Figures had both objective research and propaganda functions).
62. Sir Robert Menzies, weekly radio address, cited at http://webdiary.com.au/cms/?q
=node/930. The texts of these radio essays are available at http://www. menzies
virtualmuseum.org.au/transcripts/ForgottenPeople/ForgottenCont.html.
63. See for instance, Sir Robert Menzies, weekly radio address, July 17, 1942,
available
at
http://www.menziesvirtualmuseum.org.au/transcripts/ForgottenPeople/Forgotten6. html.
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the people given greater opportunities than ever before. 64
Fraser emphasized the opportunities that would become available in a
postwar world. In sum, the meaning of the Four Freedoms continued to
evolve throughout the course of the war. While admired by all those who
cited them, they offered variously peace, security, international cooperation,
and greater opportunities.
Roosevelt himself sought to clarify the ultimate objective of the Four
Freedoms in his January 1944 annual address to Congress. 65 Historians and
humanitarians have paid inadequate attention to this remarkable speech.
Cass Sunstein ruefully observes that FDR’s message had been lost to
history despite its ambitious and apt proposal of a “Second Bill of
Rights.” 66 In it, FDR, optimistic about a favorable outcome of the war even
after suffering two horrible years, iterated his view of “‘the one supreme
objective for the future’. . . ‘in one word: Security.’” 67 Echoing his January
1941 formulation, FDR combined “‘physical security[,] which provides
safety from attacks by aggressors,”‘ with “‘economic security, social
security, [and] moral security.”‘ 68 As Sunstein notes, Roosevelt now
insisted that “‘essential to peace is a decent standard of living for all
individual men and women and children in all Nations. Freedom from fear
is eternally linked with freedom from want.”‘ 69 In this formulation, FDR’s
clearly subsumed the Four Freedoms into one objective – security – as they
had been in January 1941, but he chose to emphasize different elements.
This first element (in contrast to the fourth freedom) addressed aggression.
At the same time, Roosevelt abandoned the reference to demilitarization as
the only way to achieve this security. Indeed, the quest for disarmament
may have been doomed from the start. Back in January 1941 FDR paired
his initial proposal for the Four Freedoms with the Lend-Lease program –
the largest arms transfer in history. 70 This was an inauspicious moment to
propose worldwide disarmament. So in January of 1944, FDR took the
opportunity to recast the freedom from fear in a more practicable direction.
The new iteration resembled less a utopian notion of disarmament and more
the practical, mostly hands-off, “good neighbor policy” that characterized
his own policy for Latin America. 71 The ultimate objective of security

64. Borgwardt, supra note __, at 553.
65. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, State of the Union Address (Jan. 11, 1944), in 12
THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 32-42 (Samuel I.
Rosenman ed., 1950); see also CASS SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR’S
UNFINISHED REVOLUTION AND WHY WE NEED IT MORE THAN EVER 4, 234 (2004).
66. See Cass R. Sunstein & Randy E. Barnett, Constitutive Commitments and
Roosevelt’s Second Bill of Rights: A Dialogue, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 205, 206 (2005).
67. Id. (quoting Roosevelt, State of the Union Address, supra note __, at 33).
68. Id. (quoting Roosevelt, State of the Union Address, supra note __, at 33).
69. Id. (quoting Roosevelt, State of the Union Address, supra note __, at 34).
70. Roosevelt, Message to Congress, supra note __.
71. Extensive literature exists on the Good Neighbor policy. See, e.g., ROBERT H.
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remained the same, but the idealistic and ill-timed notion of disarmament
gave way to the sense of community.
While FDR’s thoughts on the meaning of the Four Freedoms evolved
between January 1941 and 1944, his administration had supported scholarly
research into the notion of fundamental freedoms. During the war,
interdisciplinary teams of academics at forty-six U.S. colleges and
universities addressed the problem of developing an international bill of
rights that a new international organization would in turn defend. This
diverse group of academics laid the groundwork for what would soon
become the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. Charles A. Baylis, then an associate professor of
philosophy at Brown University, published the synthesis document of the
Universities Committee on Post-War International Problems. 72
Not
surprisingly, the Universities Committee viewed civil rights as the “most
important to guarantee internationally, supposing that such a guarantee
Professor Baylis summarized the Universities
proves feasible.” 73
Committee’s work: “By all odds the most frequently emphasized ones are
freedom of expression and freedom of religion.” 74 Following these civil
rights in priority, Baylis placed the “next most popular rights [that] can be
grouped loosely under the phrase ‘freedom from despotism.’ They are
calculated to give all individuals the protection of due process of law
without discrimination based on race, color, or religion.” 75 Then followed
the set of rights related to the exercise of voting. 76 Only then did Baylis
address the remaining of the Four Freedoms. He tacitly dismissed the hope
of enforcing the freedom from want by ignoring it in favor of a detailed
discussion of the freedom from fear.
Baylis divided the freedom from fear into two elements. “Two of the
famous Four Freedoms proposed by President Roosevelt and emphasized in
the Atlantic Charter – freedom from fear and freedom from want – are
widely acclaimed but are recognized as rather general terms which cover a
number of quite different matters.” 77 Baylis expanded on the second set:
One aspect of freedom from fear is freedom from fear of external
aggression. This, which, if a right at all, is not an individual but a
state right, is to be the primary aim of the international organization
envisaged in the Moscow Declaration on General Security [i.e. the
FERRELL, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY: A HISTORY 765-66 (3d ed. 1975) (offering a generally
sympathetic but candid appraisal); Roosevelt, First Inaugural Address, supra note __.
72. Charles A. Baylis, Towards an International Bill of Rights, 8 PUB. OPINION Q. 2,
244 (1944).
73. Id. at 248.
74. Id. (providing details on these rights).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 249.
77. Id.
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United Nations]; it, more than any other right, is likely to be
supported by adequate international guarantees. Equally implicit in
freedom from fear is the freedom from fear of such internal
despotism as described above. It too is urgently desired, but it
seems unlikely that it will receive for some time the international
support given to freedom from fear of aggression. 78
Through this and other efforts throughout the war, scholars and
statesmen acknowledged the Four Freedoms as offering a sound basis for
security in the postwar world. And while scholars were heavily involved in
formulating the security policies during the war, the process of establishing
the United Nations organization based on the promotion of the Four
Freedoms was anything but the product of ivory-tower philosophizing. The
freedoms of expression and religion were forged through centuries of
political, legal, and military contests. The freedom from want encapsulated
FDR’s practical programs to combat unemployment, homelessness and
hunger that characterized America’s grim experience during the Great
Depression. Likewise, the freedom from fear articulated a realist’s
prescription for overcoming the deadly instability posed by a chaotic
international order.
Allied leaders around the globe read or heard FDR’s Four Freedoms
speech. They strove for a world in which security and peace were linked to
and by these freedoms. 79 During the course of the war, a consensus seemed
to have developed that such a peace would be policed by the remaining
great powers, the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. 80 The
other leading powers either were on the losing side (Germany, Japan, and
Italy) or incapacitated by the war (France and China, both of which would
nonetheless soon claim permanent seats on the U.N. Security Council). The
fact that FDR’s original formulation envisioned demilitarization seems to
indicate that he hoped for a world order that transcended the more
traditional international security scheme that sought to maintain a balance
of great powers. Recognition that disarmament was not imminent and that
great powers would remain immensely powerful only became explicit in the
Charter of the United Nations – a document drafted shortly after FDR’s
death in April 1945.
The Second World War brought suffering on a previously unimaginable
scale. Unprecedented horrors – on the desolate Eastern Front, in occupied
78. Id.; see also Declaration of the Four Nations on General Security, Oct. 30, 1943, 9
DEP’T ST. BULL., Nov. 1943, at 311 [hereinafter Moscow Declaration] (recognizing “the
necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization,
based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to
membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace
and security”).
79. MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 10 (2001).
80. Maney, supra note __, at 165.
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and fragmented China, in desperate island-hopping campaigns, and most
notably in the Holocaust – catalyzed a newfound awareness of humankind’s
capacity for brutality that quickened an impulse to recognize and protect
human rights. The months after Roosevelt’s death in April 1945 brought in
quick succession the liberation of the Nazi death camps, the establishment
of the United Nations organization, the explosion of the atom bombs over
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the chartering of the international military
tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo – each of which left an indelible mark
on the world’s views about postwar security.
Respect for a small body of fundamental rights coalesced in
international law. Most notably, the right to be free from genocide
emerged, articulated with commendable clarity even if unevenly
respected. 81 Some rights – such as the freedom of expression – enjoyed a
relatively smooth ride. That is not to say that this freedom was consistently
honored during the war. Indeed most states – perhaps all – trammeled on it.
At the end of the war, however, the freedom of expression did reemerge in
a recognizable form and strengthened by the widespread recognition of the
evils of political repression. People increasingly understood that it was not
only an individual freedom but also that it was indispensable for optimizing
the efforts of governments. Other rights emerged from the war nominally
intact but somewhat altered. The young freedom from fear was one such
right.
During the summer of 1945, the drafters of the U.N. Charter set out to
institutionalize the Four Freedoms by establishing an international
organization to ensure peace and security and to promote economic and
social advancement. Fifty-one nations negotiated, signed, and ratified the
Charter intended to save humanity from “the scourge of war,. . . reaffirm
faith in fundamental human rights,. . . establish conditions under which
justice and respect for obligations can be maintained, and. . . promote social
progress and better standards for life in larger freedom.” 82 Because of their
geopolitical significance (that is to say, their size and power), the United
States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, China, and France were
endowed with permanent seats and vetoes in the dominant Security
Council. 83 The Permanent Five succeeded the Four Policemen, although
their respective and collective roles remained subject to constant
renegotiation. 84 The U.N. Charter carried the Four Freedoms forward.
81. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. For background, see WILLIAM A. SCHABAS,
GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2000); SAMANTHA POWER, “A PROBLEM FROM HELL”:
AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE (2002).
82. U.N. Charter pmbl.
83. See generally KENNEDY, supra note __, at 3-47.
84. For some background on the notion of the United States, the Soviet Union, the
United Kingdom, and China as the Four Policemen, see John Lewis Gaddis, The Long
Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War 23-24 (1987).
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While the Charter contains little substantive law, Chapter IX does address
the freedoms of expression and religion and the freedom from want. Under
this chapter, Article 55 requires the United Nations to promote “(a) higher
standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social
progress and development; (b) solutions of international economic, social,
health, and related problems. . . and (c) universal respect for, and
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.” 85 Sections (a) and (b)
address the freedom from want while section (c) responds to the freedom of
expression and religion. These issues are further addressed in the balance
of Chapter IX and in Chapter X, which establishes the Economic and Social
Council. 86
The most widely debated sections of the U.N. Charter address the
freedom from fear and the new organization’s dedication to promoting
security. Chapter I describes the purposes and principles:
To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to
take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal
of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression
or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful
means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and
international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes
or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace. 87
This text implies that fear is generated by threats to peace and acts of
aggression. Following this logic, the crime of aggression has increasingly
become clarified international legal institutions. 88
The emergent emphasis on aggression differs from the assumption
underlying FDR’s original formulation in the 1941 address to Congress that

85. U.N. Charter art. 55.
86. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights gives additional substance to these
rights. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note __. Specifically, Article 18
recognizes a human right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. Articles 19, 20,
and 21 detail and demand the freedoms of expression, including the right to hold opinions
and impart them, to peaceably assemble and associate, and to take part in government.
Articles 22, 23, and 25, among others, address the freedom from want. Drafters of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights sought to expand on these
rights and to make them more widely delivered, but success has been uneven at best. See
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 12.1, opened for
signature Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan 3, 1976).
87. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1.
88. See the London Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59
Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279; Moscow Declaration. supra note 63; TELFORD TAYLOR, FINAL
REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ON THE NUREMBERG WAR CRIMES TRIALS UNDER
CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10 (1949); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90; International Criminal Court: Special Working Group on
the Crime of Aggression, http:// www.icc-cpi.int/asp/aspaggression.html (last visited Oct.
12, 2008).
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implied that fear is caused by the level of armament or at least is best
addressed by reducing the size of arsenals. The 1941 address emphasized
demilitarization as essential to reducing fear. In contrast, the U.N. Charter
is premised on a strong notion of individual state sovereignty that accepts
the long-standing norm that states may do whatever they believe they must
in to preserve their security – up until the point at which the Security
Council determines “the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, or act of aggression.” 89 At this point, the Security Council, acting
pursuant to authority granted in Chapter VII may authorize the use of force
to restore the peace. Disarmament or demilitarization would have reduced
or removed the means available for conducting aggressive war, but it would
have done so by materially interfering in the states parties’ domestic affairs.
Instead, the Charter merely seeks to deter the use of force and apply it only
when necessary and no permanent member of the Security Council vetoes
it. As noted above, disarmament may have been a nonstarter at this point in
history, and thus it was not adopted into the basic texts of international law.
Instead, the Charter targeted aggressors (or at least those who act without
the aegis of a permanent member). Actions taken pursuant to Chapter VII
of the Charter do nothing to reduce the means or to de-escalate the
militarization of international relations or to construe states’ freedom to do
what they will within their own borders. Instead, Chapter VII seeks to
thwart overt acts of aggression. Moreover, for forty-five years following
the Charter’s enactment, with only the exception of the Korean War, the
U.N.’s authority under Chapter VII was used only to stabilize the
stalemated struggles of Great Power proxies, 90 providing few incentives or
means to facilitate demilitarization or the de-escalation of arms races.
While this may or may not have been wise, the fact remains that it is
significantly different from the method implied in the Four Freedoms
address. General demilitarization fell out of the Four Freedoms agenda
sometime between early 1941 and the spring of 1945. So the Four
Freedoms – and even the freedom from fear – survived World War II, but
meaningful efforts to disarm did not.
Following the Second World War, the General Assembly of the new
United Nations organization proclaimed the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, adopting the Four Freedoms as one piece in the preamble:
Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in
barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and
the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of
speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been

89. U.N. Charter art. 39.
90. For a concise history of the development of the U.N. peacekeeping and warmaking powers, see KENNEDY, supra note __, at 77-112.
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proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people . . . . 91
With this declaration, the Four Freedoms became part and parcel of a basic
text of international law. And while its incorporation into the Universal
Declaration did not per se create binding legal obligations, 92 its
characteristic as basic law does offer an opportunity to cultivate a security
strategy based on universally acknowledged norms. And such a strategy
need not belong merely to one country; instead it invites global support.
Subsequent multinational conventions illustrate the universality that has
enabled the Four Freedoms to survive in a dramatically changed world. As
just one example, the American Convention on Human Rights signed in
1969 linked all Four Freedoms: “Reiterating that, in accordance with the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ideal of free men enjoying
freedom from fear and want can be achieved only if conditions are created
whereby everyone may enjoy his economic, social, and cultural rights, as
well as his civil and political rights.” 93 In this idealistic convention,
security was not the objective; the ideal of free men was. So while the
ultimate purpose may be somewhat contingent, the widespread appeal of
the Four Freedoms remains strong.
III. THE FOUR FREEDOMS ENDURE THE COLD WAR
As noted above, the Four Freedoms remained an important if contested
concept during the Cold War. Even shorn of its disarmament agenda, the
freedom from fear in particular remained a powerful if indeterminate
concept from the mid-1940s until the early 1990s. Louis Henkin
optimistically labeled this epoch the “Age of Rights.” 94 Professor Henkin
noted that the stage was set at the end of the war with the adoption of the
U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well as
with the criminal convictions for crimes against humanity obtained at
Nuremberg. 95 The era ended in around 1991 when the geopolitical realities

91. Universal Declaration, pmbl. (emphasis added).
92. See, Glendon, The Rule of Law in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
infra note ___ 4 and Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in
National and International Law, infra note ___ 290, 320.
93. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, pmbl.,
Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
94. HENKIN, supra note __, at ix (1990). Louis Henkin dates the start of this age at
1948, with the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Perhaps
unsurprisingly, the categorization of this era as the Age of Rights does not reflect a
consensus. For example, Northwestern University historian Richard W. Leopold’s classic
850-page survey of U.S. foreign relations does not refer to the Four Freedoms or the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. RICHARD W. LEOPOLD, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY: A HISTORY (1962). It would be interesting to do a complete survey of
diplomatic history texts to see how (or if) they treat human rights in this era.
95. HENKIN, supra note __, at 1 (1990). The Nuremberg Principles issued in August
1945 defined crimes against humanity to require a war nexus. This requirement left a
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changed dramatically with the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the onset
of the Gulf War. Defining the Age of Rights by reference to two wars and
the promulgation of international human rights is to acknowledge that
conceptions of human rights are embedded in geopolitical reality. Violent
conflicts framed the era, but Henkin hopefully labeled it by reference to
rights and freedoms.
Among the Four Freedoms, the freedom from fear was most subject to
redefinition during the Age of Rights. Because of its ambiguity and its
universal appeal, freedom from fear quickly became a catchall phrase with
divergent and frequently inexplicit meanings. A few examples from
English language books illustrate this point. First Amendment lawyer
Morris Ernst published a The First Freedom in 1946. 96 He captioned the
first chapter “Freedom from Fear,” by which he meant that governments
should embrace, not fear, diverse speech, and thereby free themselves from
their own fears that other views would prove harmful. The book focuses
entirely on the defense and promotion of free expression as essential for
identifying social ills and refining solutions to them (i.e., the marketplace of
ideas). Likewise, New York State’s esteemed Superintendent of Insurance
Louis Pink wrote his own book titled Freedom from Fear, a work more
suited to the freedom from want, being a study of insurance and social
security. 97 Several years later, a British historian named O. A. Sherrard
published a history of slavery through 1833, titled Freedom from Fear: the
Slave and his Emancipation. 98 The popular naturalist Aldo Leopold
referred to the freedom from fear several times in his widely read A Sand
County Almanac, first published in 1949. The Almanac was ostensibly a
collection of essays on natural history, but Leopold took frequent
opportunities to reveal human nature as well. In two instances, Leopold
referred to the freedom from fear to decry the loss of the wilderness and
man’s close relationship to nature. 99 In the other instances, Leopold

significant gap in the law limiting the mistreatment of individuals or minorities outside of a
war environment. For more historical context, see GLENDON, supra note 64, at 9.
96. MORRIS L. ERNST, THE FIRST FREEDOM (1946).
97. LOUIS H. PINK, FREEDOM FROM FEAR (1944).
98. O. A. SHERRARD, FREEDOM FROM FEAR: THE SLAVE AND HIS EMANCIPATION
(1961).
99. Aldo Leopold, Chihuahua and Sonora, in A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC AND
SKETCHES HERE AND THERE 137, 144 (1949) (comprised of some older works and some
written specifically for the book). “By this time the Delta has probably been made safe for
cows, and forever dull for adventuring hunters. Freedom from fear has arrived, but a glory
has departed from the green lagoons.” Id. No fan of the universal dominion of man over
nature, even if man brought the freedom from fear, Leopold continued: “Man always kills
the thing he loves, and so we the pioneers have killed our wilderness. Some say we had to.
Be that as it may, I am glad I shall never be young without wild country to be young in. Of
what avail are forty freedoms without a blank spot on the map?” Id. at 148-49. The author’s
copy of this book is from the forty-eighth printing of the 1968 paperback edition, testifying
to the enduring and widespread popularity of this work.
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illustrated the subjective nature of the freedom from fear. In nature, he
noted, one individual’s freedom from fear necessarily obstructed another’s
freedom from want. The field mouse’s freedom from fear meant hunger for
the rough-leg hawk. 100 The question for proponents of human rights is
often whether humanity would rise above this harsh rule of nature. Leopold
was skeptical.
Somewhat more optimistically, a generation later and half a world
away, Burmese human rights and democracy activist Aung San Suu Kyi
adopted the theme and title Freedom from Fear in her 1990 acceptance of
the European Parliament’s Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought. 101
Quite reasonably in light of her situation, Suu Kyi emphasized the
importance of being free from fear of state oppression:
Among the basic freedoms to which men aspire that their lives
might be full and uncramped, freedom from fear stands out as both
a means and an end. A people who would build a nation in which
strong, democratic institutions are firmly established as a guarantee
against state-induced power must first learn to liberate their own
minds from apathy and fear. 102
In other words, those who would be free from oppression must first free
themselves of fear. Once free from fear, they can remove the source of the
oppression. Suu Kyi’s vision of freedom from fear includes the notion that
one liberates oneself from fear by becoming fearless, i.e., willing to accept
unwelcome consequences for acting and doing nothing to prevent the others
from imposing those them. While brave and laudable, this is not the
freedom from fear that FDR had described.
None of these books addressed issues of international peace and
security – let alone demilitarization. So while the Four Freedoms survived
the Age of Rights, their content remained contested and subjective. In fact,
as Mary Ann Glendon notes, during the late 1940s and 1950s, political
pressures rended the package into incoherent pieces. Its organic unity was,
however, one of the first casualties of the Cold War. The United States and
its arch-rival, the Soviet Union, could not resist treating the Declaration as
an arsenal of political weapons: each yanked its favorite provisions out of
context and ignored the rest. What began as expediency hardened into
habit, until the sense of an integrated body of principles was lost. Today
the Four Freedoms and the Universal Declaration have become almost
universally regarded as a kind of menu of rights from which one can pick
100.

Aldo Leopold, January Thaw, in A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC AND SKETCHES HERE
supra note __, at 3, 4.
101. AUNG SAN SUU KYI, Freedom from Fear, reprinted in FREEDOM FROM FEAR AND
OTHER WRITINGS 3 (Michael Aris ed., 1991). Freedom from Fear was first released for
publication in various newspapers and magazines to commemorate the awarding in absentia
of this prestigious human rights prize.
102. Id. at 183.
AND THERE,
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and choose according to taste. 103 Perhaps treating them like a menu is an
inevitable mistake, given the standard method of interpreting constitutions
as a series of freestanding rules. Lawyers and courts typically interpret the
specific provision that appears most relevant for deciding the issue before
them. 104 However, FDR had not intended any one freedom to trump the
others. As Rene Cassin explained them, they may be considered a step
leading to the entrance of a classical temple of rights. 105 All other rights are
columns resting on this step. If viewed this way, they offer strong support
for a principled international order.
IV. THE FOUR FREEDOMS AS A PARADIGM FOR PEACE AND SECURITY
On this day, we gather because we have chosen hope over fear,
unity of purpose over conflict and discord. 106
By restoring the Four Freedoms to a central place in its grand strategy,
the United States can privilege hope over fear and unity of purpose over
conflict and discord – at home and around the world. History shows that
states adjust their grand strategies for many reasons and that the success of
these efforts depends in great part on the way they redefine themselves and
their objectives. The most obvious catalyst for a significant change in
strategy is a catastrophic military defeat. Under such circumstances, a state
can collapse and subject itself to dictated terms (France in 1940) – or
regroup and continue the fight (the Soviet Union, the following summer).
Sometimes states adjust their strategy to accommodate the appearance of a
significant new rival (Britain in the early twentieth century) or a new
weapon (the 1950s development of nuclear weapons and delivery systems
that created a situation of Mutual Assured Destruction). In general, absent
this sort of defining event, however, strategic adjustment is most successful
when organized around an idea or ideology that captivates the nation and
embraced by institutions of state security. 107
103. GLENDON, supra note 64, at xviii. Likewise, in the wake of 9/11 many leaders
around the world re-focused their attention on the freedom from fear. For example,
distinguished Canadian lawyer and Member of Parliament Irwin Cotler defined human
security as “freedom from fear – freedom from these pervasive terrorism threats to people’s
fundamental rights, safety, or lives.” Irwin Cotler, Terrorism, Security and Rights: The
Dilemma of Democracies, 14 NAT’L J. CONST. L. 13 (2002) (rejecting the notion that new
national security legislation is trading liberty for security when it is actually securing the
freedom from fear).
104. See generally BREYER, supra note __ (arguing that provisions of the U.S.
Constitution should be interpreted in light of--and to promote--its democratic objectives).
105. Glendon, The Rule of Law in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra
note ___ citing to RENÉ CASSIN: FANTASSIN DES DROITS DE L'HOMME 317 (1979).
106. President Barack Hussein Obama, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2009) available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/inaugural-address/.
107. Mark Shulman, Institutionalizing A Political Idea: Navalism and the Emergence of
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Wolfgang Friedmann correctly observed that “each generation has to
draw afresh for itself a picture of the kind of world in which it lives, and to
seek to define the goals which it is striving to reach.” 108 If recognized as
reflective of American values and appropriate for meeting the threats and
opportunities facing the nation today, the Four Freedoms draw such a
picture and frame those goals. And if embraced by President Obama and
the national security apparatus, they can serve as a wise guide for strategic
adjustment at this critical moment. Upon the President’s orders, they can
be written into the new National Security Strategy and the various
institutional mandates that it dictates. As the previous section showed, this
process began during the desperate years of World War II and stalled
shortly thereafter. It should be resumed today in order to bolster the law
and order enterprise that enables civilization to squeeze out opportunities
for extremists to construct far-flung networks and perpetrate their ugly
crimes.
Restoring the Four Freedoms to the centerpiece of grand strategy would
advance the “Transnational Legal Process” hailed by some as a powerful
force for ensuring security. 109 It would do so by constraining U.S.
behavior to conform to the Four Freedoms, by building stronger norms to
promote meaningful, just and enduring security, and by changing people’s
minds about what actually constitutes meaningful security. In short, it
would help people realize that the nation’s well-being is best ensured by the
maintenance of a rule of law system at the center of which is a respect for
human dignity – and not by a myopic pursuit of military victories.
Because they embody universal legal norms, the Four Freedoms
provide a more useful framework for U.S. policy than the inopportune term
“War on Terror.” The Four Freedoms present a more descriptive, evocative
and appropriate paradigm for national security decision making than did the
concept that had until recently characterized U.S. policy since 9/11. For
purposes of this argument, the various terms used or proposed by the

American Sea Power in THE POLITICS OF STRATEGIC ADJUSTMENT: IDEAS, INSTITUTIONS, AND
INTERESTS (Peter Trubowitz, Emily O. Goldman & Edward Rhodes, eds., 1999); MARK
RUSSELL SHULMAN, NAVALISM AND THE EMERGENCE OF AMERICAN SEA POWER 1882-1893
(1995).
108. Wolfgang Friedmann, General Course in Public International Law, in 127
RECUEIL DES COURS 39, 229 (1969) (Fr.) as cited by Antônio Augusto Cançado Trinidade,
The Human Person and International Justice, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 16, 18 (Spring
2008 Wolfgang Friedmann Award address) (2008).
109. For more on this Transnational Legal Process, see Harold Hongju Koh, Filártiga v.
Peña-Irala: Judicial Internalization into Domestic Law of the Customary International Law
Norm Against Torture, in INTERNATIONAL LAW STORIES (John E. Noyes, Laura A. Dickinson
& Mark W. Janis, eds., 2007) citing to Harold Hongju Koh, The 1994 Roscoe Pound
Lecture: Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181 (1996). See also Catherine
Powell, The Role of Transnational Norm Entrepreneurs in the U.S. “War on Terrorism”, 5
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 47, 77 (theorizing about dialogic approaches to human rights
norms, an iterative process whereby greater adherence to these norms leaders to further
expansion of their recognition).
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Administration of George W. Bush at different times are treated
collectively, including not only “War on Terror” but also the “Global War
on Terrorism,” “Long War,” “Global War on Islamic Extremism,” and
other related terms. At their center, each of these phrases contains the
notion of a war. 110 Unfortunately, the notion of war brings misleading and
unhelpful connotations of start and stop dates, a special paradigm of
constraints on conduct (jus in bello), a bias toward military solutions, and a
state-centeredness.
Labeling the current security situation as a war implicates untenable
assumptions about a start date and an unambiguous ending. Transnational
terrorism has neither a Pearl Harbor moment nor the signing of an
unconditional surrender on deck of a battleship. 111 The jihadist threat
existed and killed people for many years before 9/11. And even when al
Qaeda’s leaders are dead, captured, or otherwise retired from the fray, the
United States may not recognize the end of the threat they posed. Nor can
the United States afford a war that may not end. On the other hand,
because it invests mostly in developing human capital rather than
destroying it, the national can afford a campaign to promote the enduring
values encompassed within the Four Freedoms. As many scholars have
noted over the years, “Better protection of human rights around the world
would make the United States safer and more secure.” 112 This is not to

110. E.g., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM,
COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 2006, Ch. 5 (2007), http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/
2006/index.htm; OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, DEP’T
OF STATE AND OTHER INT’L PROGRAMS, BUDGET DOCUMENTS (2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2009/state.html; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE & U.S.
AGENCY FOR INT’L DEVELOPMENT, TRANSFORMATIONAL DIPLOMACY, JOINT STRATEGIC PLAN
FISCAL YEAR 2007 – 2012, 18, 51 (2007), available at http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/86291.pdf; Michael Hayden, Director, Central Intelligence Agency,
Atlantic Council (Nov. 13, 2008), https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speechestestimony/speeches-testimony-archive-2008/directors-remarks-at-the-atlantic-council.html.
111. Even in wars traditionally thought to have clearly defined start and stop dates, the
limits can be contentious. Steven I. Vladeck, Ludecke’s Lengthening Shadow: the
Disturbing Prospect of War without End, 2 J. NAT’L SEC. L & POL’Y 53 (2006).
112. William W. Burke-White, Human Rights and National Security: The Strategic
Correlation, 17 HARV. HUM RTS. J. 249 (2004). Accord, Assessing Damage, Urging Action,
infra note , at 24 (concluding that “international human rights law was elaborated precisely
to guarantee people’s safety.”) at 47 (“a military response to terrorism may seem to offer a
short-term solution, but often creates long-term problems: a security perspective alone can
become so dominant that other approaches are neglected, and human rights and the rule of
law are undermined.”), 49 and ff. See also, numerous works by Harold Hongju Koh, for
instance Civil Liberties and National Security, A conversation with Harold Koh, Norman
Dorsen, and John Deutch, Moderated by Carl Kaysen (American Academy of Arts and
Sciences) (Feb. 4, 2002) (“If the globalization of freedom is going to triumph over the
globalization of terror, in the long run, we—as a nation conceived in liberty and dedicated to
certain inalienable rights, including liberty and justice for all—must respond not just with
power alone, but with power coupled with principle.”) available at http://www.amacad.
org/events/civil_liberties.pdf.
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suggest that military operations have no place in dealing with al Qaeda, but
it does require that all such operations shall be undertaken in accordance
with the demands of human rights law and humanitarian law. Security will
not come through a suspension of the ordinary rule of law – a set of
constraints designed specifically to provide order and security. Rather, the
rule of law is generally both the best measure and the most effective means
of promoting security.
The notion of a global war implicates a suspension of the ordinary rule
of law and an activation of the laws of war – everywhere or possibly
nowhere. This specialized body of law is poorly suited to regulating
relations between strong states and militant fundamentalists. The Islamists’
jihad does not have the state or legal mechanisms, defined geographical
boundaries or battlefields, the uniforms, repeat transactions, or shared sense
of chivalry necessary for sustaining the laws of war. Historically, this body
of law has always been strained by wars of liberation, civil war, or other
nontraditional modes of combat. 113 And it disintegrates (or more accurately
fails to coalesce) when governments or armies fail to learn how to apply it
because “[t]here [is] no time for reciprocity to develop.” 114 As a result,
labeling the current situation a “war” puts the United States and its allies
under obligations to comply with the laws of war where they may or may
not be relevant. Certainly, in portions of Afghanistan and Iraq the
conditions of war continue to exist. 115 Where combat falls under the
mandate of international humanitarian law, that body of principles should
be applied, as in the operations against the Taliban’s armed forces in
southern or eastern Afghanistan. However, the concept of warfare
generally fails to explain operations in such contested venues as Baidoa,
O’Hare International Airport or cyberspace. So the laws of war are
impractical in many of the places where U.S. interests are being contested.
That does not leave a void of law. Municipal law, human rights law, and at
least some Constitution restraints apply, and “access to an independent
judiciary is absolutely essential.” 116 Fortunately, the Four Freedoms can

113. See George J. Andreopoulos, The Age of National Liberation Movements, in THE
LAWS OF WAR: CONSTRAINTS ON WARFARE IN THE WESTERN WORLD 191-213 (Michael
Howard, George J. Andreopoulos & Mark R. Shulman eds., 1994); Michael Howard,
Constraints of Warfare, in THE LAWS OF WAR, supra, at 1-11.
114. Geoffrey Parker, Early Modern Europe, in THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note __, at
57.
115. Accord Maqaleh v. Gates, Civil Action No. 06-1697, (D.D.C. Apr. 2, 2009)
generally and in particular at footnote 6 (applying the rule of Boumediene v. Bush (infra
note __) to cover non-Afghan detainees at the U.S.-controlled Bagram Airfield while
signaling “deference to the Executive’s conduct of the war in Afghanistan.”).
116. Assessing Damage, Urging Action, infra note ___, at 43, 51 (“no such black hole
exists in either in international human rights or humanitarian law”). Boumediene v. Bush,
128 S. Ct. 2229, 2259 (2008) (“Our basic charter cannot be contracted away like this . . . .
Even when the United States acts outside its borders, its powers are not ‘absolute and
unlimited’ but are subject ‘to such restrictions as are expressed in the [C]onstitution.”‘
(quoting Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 44 (1885))).
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sensibly be applied everywhere.
Finally, labeling the situation a war almost inevitably implicates the use
of armed forces – with ensuing risks and costs. As brave and capable as
members of America’s professional armed forces are, they are inherently
incapable of addressing the full range of threats we face. Since the tragic
war in Vietnam, western militaries have learned – or relearned – the art of
unconventional warfare. These skills have enabled soldiers to function
effectively in forests, villages, and in cities. New technology has even
enabled modern armies to engage in combat in cyberspace. 117 But they are
not capable of discriminating between financial transactions and
communications of terrorists and those of civilians. So using armed forces
to interdict these interactions raises the costs of collateral damage to
And while they can adapt to tackle
intolerably high levels. 118
nontraditional, psychological, propagandistic, urban, financial threats,
doing so will significantly degrade their war-fighting capacity. Armed
forces are exceedingly expensive, and in such a sprawling, amorphous
campaign, it is misguided or misleading to think that the United States can
or should address challenges principally with the machinery of war.
Moreover and ironically, by deploying military resources, we reify the
threat, giving it an undeserved quantum of legitimacy. The Bush
administration’s “War on Terror” bolstered the jihadists by honoring their
anarchic campaign as a war. The United States contributed significantly to
their recruitment efforts when it unnecessarily exposed fine soldiers and
marines to their suicide bombers. Similarly, incidents of torture and other
cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment foster support or at least sympathy
for the nation’s enemies. 119 The state-centeredness of a war paradigm
likewise gives al Qaeda a higher profile and more opportunities to cultivate
recruits and develop partners.
Now that the Obama administration has dropped the characterization of
“war,” this article proposes adopting a grand strategy defined by effort to
promote and protect the values articulated in the Four Freedoms. Dropping
the concept of a “War on Terror” enables the Obama administration to
avoid or extract the nation from many of the traps into which the previous
117. See Mark R. Shulman, Note, Discrimination in the Laws of Information Warfare,
37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 939 (1999) (arguing for continuation of the laws of war to the
then nascent activity of cyber-warfare).
118. See ERIC LICHTBLAU, BUSH’S LAW: THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN JUSTICE (2008)
(describing the resistance of Congress and the American people to defense programs that
intercept electronic communications and information about financial transactions).
119. See the “Senate Armed Services Committee Inquiry Into The Treatment Of
Detainees In U.S. Custody” (Dec. 11, 2008) (citing Former Navy General Counsel Alberto
Mora’s testimony that “there are serving U.S. flag-rank officers who maintain that the first
and second identifiable causes of U.S. combat deaths in Iraq – as judged by their
effectiveness in recruiting insurgent fighters into combat – are, respectively the symbols of
Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo.”) the redacted Executive Summary of which is available at
http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/supporting/2008/Detainees.121108.pdf.
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Administration had stepped. For just as wise and successful leaders avoid
unnecessary wars, they should what they can to avoid clashes of
civilizations. The United States can now avoid unnecessarily putting
neutrals in a tight position. It is unnecessary and misguided to compare the
actions of the United States to those of the Taliban or al Qaeda.
Unfortunately the logic of war dictates an unhelpful “us versus them”
rhetoric that demands such comparisons. A grand strategy based on the
pursuit of meaningful values, on the other hand, invites all people to strive
to be their best selves. The experience of the past eight years shows that in
a “War on Terror,” the freedom from fear tends to trump other concerns.
This leads to a situation in which a President declares “[y]ou are either with
us or you are against us in the fight against terror.”120 Once that Manichean
division is made, other countries are either good or bad, and other freedoms
give way. America’s right to be free of fear claims to trumps the rights of
individuals to freedom of expression or religion or to be free from want or
fear themselves. 121
More generally, the United States should strive purposefully to avoid
triggering a clash between the pluralistic “West” and “Islam.” But by
declaring “wars,” Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” could
become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Indeed, one learned observer claims that
this was Huntington’s intention and that senior members of the Bush
administration embraced that mission. 122 To extricate itself from this trap,
the United States should protect and promote values that have received near
universal acclaim and that are embodied in domestic and international law
around the world. As the Eminent Jurist Panel on Terrorism, Counterterrorism and Human Rights concluded, “Human Rights can no longer
remain a rhetorical add-on to counter-terrorist thinking, but must become a
central plank in the global response to terrorism.” 123 Embracing the Four
120. Press Release, Office of the White House Press Secretary, President Welcomes
President Chirac to White House (Nov. 11, 2001), available at http:// www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2001/11/20011106-4.html.
121. See Jeremy Waldron, Safety and Security 85 NEB. L. REV. at 454, 482-485 (2006)
(noting unequal and unfair distribution of security benefits of a simplistic trade off of liberty
for security).
122. The late Samuel P. Huntington introduced this concept in a widely read article,
The Clash of Civilizations?, FOREIGN AFF., Summer 1993, at 22, and expanded on it in THE
CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER (1996). Likening him to
Islamic radicals, Stephen Holmes accuses Huntington of having intended the “clash of
civilizations” to become self-fulfilling. Holmes argues “By painting their respective
enemies as more unified and aggressive than they actually are, both Huntington and Islamic
radicals hope to boost solidarity and awaken warlike passions on their own side.” Searching
for the New Enemy after the Cold War, in THE MATADOR’S CAPE: AMERICA’S RECKLESS
RESPONSE TO TERROR 131-132 (2007)). Professor Holmes goes on to say that Huntington
succeeded in the wake of 9/11, observing that Vice President Richard Cheney’s speeches
“after the terror attacks conveyed almost a sense of relief that here finally was a global
enemy on the scale of communism” (citing reporting by George Packer) at 154.
123. Eminent Jurists Panel on Terrorism, Counter-terrorism and Human Rights,
Assessing Damage, Urging Action, 13 (2009).
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Freedoms offers just this opportunity. Individually, they derive from a
U.S.-framed consensus of enlightenment values. And they were quickly
adopted as part and parcel of international law. They enable governments
to draw on the entire range of security assets, including the nation’s
diplomatic, military, intelligence, and economic apparatus, as well as on
immense power yielded by the authentic and consistent application of the
rule of law – including the criminal justice systems of the United States and
countries around the world. Moreover, this campaign would enable the
United States to focus on promoting basic human rights that will rebuild the
goodwill that has enabled the country to inspire good and to wield so much
soft power over the years.
On the other hand, declarations of war have frequently brought
psychosocial advantages to those who seek it, so abandoning the “War on
Terror” may undermine the nation’s will to pursue security objectives.
Perhaps a campaign to promote and defend Four Freedoms will prove
insufficiently rousing. Perhaps the American people need the rhetoric of a
war to muster sufficient resources to “win.” Some parents will quite
reasonably balk at sending their sons and daughters to fight and die for the
sake of protecting universal freedoms. And indeed they should. For at
least the near future, the United States cannot easily extricate itself from the
actual wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. As a result, some brave Americans
will be injured or die in these faraway lands. For better and for worse,
these remain actual wars. Moreover, the pursuit of the Four Freedoms may
even lead to another war. In 1941, the Four Freedoms did not preclude or
prevent war. However, they did provide a framework for making sensible
foreign policy decisions, including whether a war is necessary. They
provide an informed and humane structure that allows nations to order
priorities and allocate resources. Presumably – but not inevitably – with
this decision-making framework, fewer young people will die in wars of
choice. And parents will continue to accept these terrible sacrifices for the
sake of liberty and security.
Even so, while a campaign for the Four Freedoms offers significant
advantages, it is too indeterminate to constitute a completely satisfactory
solution. Each freedom is briefly stated and culturally contingent enough
that defining it presents ample opportunities for disagreement,
disingenuousness, and sincere conflicts of interest. President George W.
Bush’s second inaugural address offers one notable example of the
indeterminacy of a freedom agenda. Echoing FDR’s January 1941 address,
Bush proclaimed, “The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of
freedom in all the world.” 124 At first blush, Bush’s war of aggression
against Iraq, the extraordinary renditions, and the water-boarding, all
conflict with the expansion of freedom. Defenders of these policies might
124. President George W. Bush, Second Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2005), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/01/20050120-1.html.
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argue that the pursuit of freedom requires some limited tradeoffs. That, of
course, is precisely the problem with reading the Four Freedoms as items
on a menu. Doing so invites choices and trade-offs. Rather, they must be
read collectively and with an eye toward finding interpretations that will
achieve the general objective of security through the pursuit of freedoms of
expression and belief and from want and fear. Rather than framing security
as a question of trade-offs, it could be described as a set of opportunities.
Doing so may not end the trading off of values for security completely, but
should result in fewer and more carefully calculated sacrifices.
Barack Obama has already made a serious effort to interpret the Four
Freedoms. In his 2006 book, The Audacity of Hope, he described them and
chose to emphasize the priority of the third and fourth freedoms. “Our own
experience tells us that those last two freedoms –freedom from want and
freedom from fear – are prerequisites for all others.” 125 Happily, his more
recent expressions treated them as one formula for U.S. foreign relations.
In May 2008, he discussed the tumultuous history of inter-American
relations.
What we all strive for is freedom as FDR described it. Political
freedom. Religious freedom. But also freedom from want, and
freedom from fear. At our best, the United States has been a force
for these four freedoms in the Americas. But if we’re honest with
ourselves, we’ll acknowledge that at times we’ve failed to engage
the people of the region with the respect owed to a partner. 126
Clearly, Obama understands the importance of the Four Freedoms as an
expression of American – and shared – values. But the question remains
open about how to apply those values.
Justice Stephen Breyer’s method of interpreting the Constitution is
helpful here for offering a useful model interpretation. In Active Liberty,
Breyer examines six constitutional doctrines (including free speech) one
after another and each as they relate to the basic purpose of the
Constitution’s essential nature as an instrument of a democracy. 127 By
articulating the overall purpose of the Constitution, he provides a structure
for facilitating analysis that works through some of the ambiguities,
tensions, and conflicts in its text. For Breyer, this method leads to statutory
and constitutional interpretations that are consistent with the people’s
will. 128
The Four Freedoms should be read similarly. As noted above, the
125. BARACK OBAMA, THE AUDACITY OF HOPE: THOUGHTS ON RECLAIMING THE
AMERICAN DREAM 317 (2006).
126. Remarks of Senator Barack Obama: Renewing U.S. Leadership in the Americas
(May 23, 2008). 2008 WLNR 981527.
127. Breyer, supra note __. Ambassador Glendon makes a similar point for
interpreting the Universal Declaration. GLENDON, supra note __, at xviii.
128. BREYER, supra note __, at 115.
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overall objective that Roosevelt articulated back in January 1941 was to
achieve a world “which we seek to make secure . . . [and] founded upon
four essential human freedoms.” 129 The Four Freedoms should be read to
promote this objective. Even read generously, however, the Four Freedoms
cannot provide detailed policy prescriptions, but they do offer a concise
statement of the values that a people promote and of the aspirations against
which policies can be evaluated.
Allowing one of the Four Freedoms to overwhelm the others leads to
iniquity and instability. If all four are treasured and weighed together in
crafting foreign policy, FDR implied, then the outcome may prove more
enduring. The freedom of expression should ensure that women can attend
school and participate in civil society in Afghanistan where they face
Taliban oppression and in Pakistan where the state cannot or will not fund
decent schools for women. The Four Freedoms may support efforts in
those countries to invest in education that produces greater wealth and more
stability. Respect for freedom of belief should ensure equal treatment for
religious minorities in Baghdad where they are forced behind blast barriers
and on the New Jersey Turnpike where they face racial profiling. 130
Moreover, support for policies that promote these universal values
would give people around the world a meaningful sense of participating in a
common enterprise of guiding decision makers to more enlightened
policies. Protectionist tariffs that drive up the price of food result in hunger
and want in ways that starkly mirror the effects of warlords blocking the
flow of emergency relief supplies. Freer markets for foodstuff should lead
to less want. 131 And torture and other so-called “alternative interrogation
techniques” are irreconcilable with the freedom from fear, much as are
attacks on hotels, office towers, or transit systems. Neither can be tolerated
because they violate the individual’s freedom from fear and society’s
demands for common decency. For democracies to prevail and achieve
FDR’s vision for security, they must fund schools, resist impulses to
profile, reduce tariffs, and desist from using fear as a tool. But mostly,
policy decisions should be made to account for all the freedoms and should
do so as for individuals as well as for states.
If the United States shifts to a campaign to protect the Four Freedoms,
what should be said about the “War on Terror”? Notwithstanding the
rhetoric of war, even the Bush administration and other governments did
deploy nonmilitary instruments such as bilateral, multilateral, and
international diplomacy, human and technical intelligence, public relations,

129. Roosevelt, Message to Congress, supra note __, at 46-47.
130. David Kocieniewski & Robert Hanley, Racial Profiling Was the Routine, New
Jersey Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2000, at A1.
131. See Raj Bhala, Generosity And America’s Trade Relations With Sub-Saharan
Africa 18 PACE INT’L L. REV. 133 (2006) (arguing that generosity to the less fortunate should
play a role in U.S. trade policy).
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antiracketeering (anti-money laundering regimes, extraditions, and criminal
trials), counter-proliferation regimes, scholarship, and even the occasional
charm offensive. Unfortunately, President Obama’s inaugural address
characterized the situation as a war. “Our nation is at war, against a farreaching network of violence and hatred.” 132 At least this characterization
marks a shift to a more accurate characterization of the enemy as a network
not a tactic. 133 However, in his first few weeks in office, the President
distanced himself from the concept of a “war on terror,” and he has quickly
moved to dismantle some of its most destructive and infamous elements.
As weeks turn to months, he appears to be going even further and
abandoned the term “War on Terror.” 134 As the president continues to
move further away from the concept of a war, he will be in a better position
to reconstitute a coalition of states, non-state actors, nongovernmental
organizations, international organizations, and individuals around the world
who do believe in the freedoms of religion and speech, and want a world
free of want—and of fear.
CONCLUSION
History shows that the Four Freedoms can sustain the hard-nosed
realism of security. While there are compelling deontological reasons for
promoting them, Roosevelt was not a philosopher. He understood that the
Four Freedoms offer practical prescriptions for maintaining international
peace and security. The Four Freedoms recognize the impulses and needs
of each person and seek to channel them toward mutual respect and
cooperation or at least toleration. Acknowledging these fundamental needs
encourages the formation of institutions designed to maximize the release
of each individual’s creative energy. The fact that the U.S. domestic order
respects the freedoms of expression and religion and sustains institutions
that alleviate want and fear goes much further toward explaining America’s
security – and its prosperity – than do the bounty of natural resources with
which the land is blessed. And if this framework can enable a sprawling,
heterogeneous, and fractious country such as the United States to thrive,
then it has a chance of working around the world.

132. President Barack Hussein Obama, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2009) available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/inaugural-address/.
Attorney-General designate Eric
Holder also characterized the situation as a “war” in his initial confirmation hearings, a
response that earned a warm endorsement from Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC).
Associated Press, Obama’s AG pick earns praise, GOP support, Jan. 16, 2009 available at
http://www. npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=99380499.
133. An insightful blog entry examines Great Britain’s turn away from the concept of a
“war on terror” because it was deemed misleading and unhelpful. Mike Nizza, Britain
Deserts War on Terror (the Phrase) THE LEDE FROM THE N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2007,
available at http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/04/16/britain-deserts-war-on-terror-thephrase/.
134. See supra note 2.
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Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair noted recently, “We will not
win the battle against global extremism unless we win it at the level of
values as much as that of force. We can win only by showing that our
values are stronger, better, and more just than the alternative.” 135
Unfortunately, Blair framed the issue as a “battle.” Values are not only
tested in battles; they have often been destroyed in the process of fighting
battles. That said, Blair’s basic message remains vivid and important:
“This is not [a] clash between civilizations; it is a clash about
civilization.” 136 Just as President Roosevelt worked with Prime Minister
Churchill in 1941 to frame the Atlantic Charter, the American President
could have profited in 2001 from a more meaningful collaboration with his
British counterpart. However, at the end of the day, neither President Bush
nor Mr. Blair actually articulated those particular values that define
civilization. Happily, their predecessors did so when they reflected the
Four Freedoms into the Atlantic Charter. With the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, those same values were incorporated into the fundamental
texts of international law. Today, those same Four Freedoms offer a
framework for an effective security strategy. And as noted above, Barack
Obama recognizes them providing as a valuable guide. And he has vowed
to end torture, close Guantanamo, and to “reject, as false, the choice
between safety and our ideals.” 137
The principal value this framework offers is as an integrated
interpretative tool, much like Justice Breyer’s notion of active liberty. The
United States faces many significant threats to its long-term security and
prosperity. These include the effects of climate change, degradation of the
natural and built environments, energy insecurity, organized crime, shifting
global employment patterns that accelerate growth of wealth disparities and
destabilize communities, and yes, the possibility that a terrorist may use a
weapon of mass destruction. But declarations of war – against poverty,
crime, drugs, or terror – do not constitute practical solutions. By
privileging a narrow interpretation of the freedom from fear over other
freedoms, the language of war demands that all other policy objectives
automatically assume lower priority. Waging wars also tends to occlude
power in the executive who is charged by the Constitution with the
principal responsibility for waging war. In sum, by declaring one of these
wars, policy makers unhelpfully limit the nation’s ability to make rational
decisions about the allocation of resources. When compared with the
pursuit of a “War on Terror,” the elegance of the Four Freedoms as a
strategy is its facilitation of policies informed by objective intelligence,
composed through rational decision making, and implemented strategically
135. Tony Blair, A Battle for Global Values, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2007, at 79.
136. Id. at 82. Of course, many people have made this point without also committing
their nation’s troops to an aggressive war.
137. President Barack Hussein Obama, Inaugural Address, supra note ___.
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